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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WILLARD S. ROSE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v s . 
ALLIED DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 19488 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Willard S. Rose, appellant herein, appeals the order of the Third 
Judicial District Court, which granted Summary Judgment to 
defendant-respondent, in Willard jS. Rose v . Allied Development Co. , Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil 
No. C-83-811, entered on August 23, 1983, and respectfully submits this 
Brief of Appellant in support of his appeal, as follows: 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, 
contractual and tortious wrongful discharge and breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The action arose out of AUied's 
termination of Mr. Rosefs employment contrary to the parties1 agreement. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
I 
The case was decided by the court on Allied's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. From a Final Order Granting Summary Judgment to Defendant 
Allied Development Company, Mr. Rose appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mr. Rose seeks reversal of the summary judgment and judgment in his 
favor as a matter of law, or that failing, remand to the Third Judicial District 
Court for further proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE * 
On February 2, 1983, appellant, hereinafter Mr. Rose, filed his 
Complaint to initiate this action. The Complaint alleges several causes of 
action, including breach of contract , promissory estoppel, contractual 
wrongful discharge, tortious wrongful discharge and breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
1 
On or about February 28, 1983, respondent , hereinafter Allied, filed its 
Answer to Mr. RoseTs Complaint, therein admitting and denying Mr. Rose's 
averments (hereinafter Answer). 
On May 12, 1983, Mr. Rose sent Interrogatories Propounded to 
Defendant, pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On May 24, 1983, at the hour of 9:00 a .m. , Allied took the deposition of 
Mr. Rose, pursuant to Rule 30, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter 
D
- _ ) -
- 2 -
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On 01 about June 24, 1983, Allied filed and mailed to Mr. Rose its 
answers to Mr. Rosefs Interrogatories (hereinafter I n t . ) . 
On or about June 8, 1983, Allied filed it Notice of Motion, Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion for 
Summary Judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On July 28, 1983, Mr. Rose filed his Memorandum in Response to 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment and his supporting Affidavit. 
On August 4, 1983, Allied filed Defendant's Reply Memorandum and 
supporting Affidavits. 
On August 5, 1983, a hearing was held on Allied's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, before the Honorable Peter F . Leary, Utah Third Judicial District 
Court Judge. Counsel for Mr Rose and Allied agreed to submit the motion 
on the memoranda and affidavits as filed. 
On August 22, 1983, the Honorable Peter F . Leary executed the Final 
Order Granting Summary Judgment to Defendant Allied Development Company, 
which was entered on August 23, 1983. From this order , Mr. Rose filed his 
Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, on September 19, 1983. 
On September 29, 1983, Mr. Rose filed his Designation of Record and 
Certificate stating that no t ranscript was required because no oral argument 
occurred during the summary judgment hearing. 
- 3 • -
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On October 4, 1983, Mr. Rose filed his Docketing Statement in the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
i 
In August, 1981, Allied hired Mr. Rose as Assistant Manager-Sales Clerk 
of its Shoe Department. Answer No. 4. See also, letter executed by Richard 
Cowley, on September 7, 1982, attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
Mr. Rose was hired under an oral agreement for a term of employment of 
. i 
indefinite duration. 
On or about January , 1982, Mr. RoseTs job requirements were 
i 
substantially increased through additional responsibilities for shoe departments 
in other stores as well as handling shoe sales at the Murray s tore . Answer 
No. 5. 
1 
.Between March and June , 1982, Allied promoted Mr. Rose to Manager of 
the Shoe Department and he was required to coordinate sales between the 
4 
Tooele, Sandy and Murray s tores . D-8, line 6 through D-9, line 5. 
In July, 1982, Mr. Rose met with "his supervisor , John Wetsel, 
concerning possible college attendance. "Mr. Wetsel informed [Mr. Rose] that 
there would be no difficulty with his attending school so long as his school 
obligations did not interfere with his job dut ies ." Answer No. 6. Fur ther , 
Mr. Wetsel told Mr. Rose that as long as Mr. Rose maintained his average 
number of hours per week, approximately 45 hours , and insured that the 
- 4 -
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sales floor was supervised, he had no problem with Mr. Rose going back to 
school. He then did specify that Mr. Rose shouh: inter inform him of the 
details. D-29, lines 14-18, D-33, lines 16-19. If Allied or Mr. Wetsel had 
then, or later, but prior to registration, stated that he did not want 
Mi hose to attend school while working, Mr. Rose would not have pursued 
college attendance. D-30, lines 8-11. 
Subsequent to such meeting, Mr. Rose and Rayne Johnstun, Assistant 
Manager of the Shoe Department, drew up tentative class schedules to 
determine if the requirements could be met, "because we knew we aci to meet 
the hour requirement and the supervision of the selling floor requirements." 
D-31, lines 10-17. 
In August, 1982, Mr. Wetsel, Mr. Rose and Rayne Johnstun conferred in 
Mr. Wetsel's office concerning the employees' college attendance. All three 
reviewed the class schedules and determined that this class scheduling would 
allow both Mr. Rose and Rayne Johnstun to work their average 45 hours per 
week and provide supervisory coverage to the sales floor at all times. D-32, 
line 17 through D-33, line 5. Mr. Wetsel stated that the schedules looked 
fine and that as long as Mr. Rose and Mr. Johnstun maintained their 45 hours 
per week, and supervision over the selling floor, he saw no problem with 
Mr. Rose start ing school. Id. and D-33, lines 3-4; D-34, lines 11-15. 
The 45-hours-per-week requirement was an estimation based upon the 
average number of hours worked by Mr. Rose and Rayne Johnstun. Previous 
working schedules had alternated between Mr. Rose and Mr. Johnstun 
working five and one half days per week and Mr. Rose and Mr. Johnstun 
- 5 -
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working six days one week and five days the next . The average number of 
hours required was approximately 45. 
Mr. Rose then registered for full-time attendance at Westminister 
College. His Fall semester tuition charges totalled the sum of $1,645. A 
copy of a letter verifying such charges is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. Mr. Rose also incurred costs for 
books at an estimated amount of $97.81. A copy of such estimation produced 
by Folletts Westminister Book Store is attached hereto as Exhibit !tCn and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
Although Mr. Wetsel had expressly approved the class scheduling as 
meeting the aforementioned conditions, Allied's only subsequent reaction 
concerning the number of hours that Mr. Rose worked was that Mr. Rose 
should be available to work longer hours when needed and certain hours 
during the day when specific tasks were required. Int . No. 7, paragraph 3. 
In addition, f ![i]n part icular, Mr. Wetsel stated that he needed considerably 
more flexibility in [Mr. Rose's] work schedule". Int . No. 12(a), lines 4-6. 
Lack of flexibility because of Mr. Rose's class schedule, which was 
previously approved by Mr. Wetsel, was the reason for Mr. Wetsel!s 
subsequent ultimatum to Mr. Rose. Such ultimatum was given on or about 
October 16, 1982, and ostensibly provided Mr. Rose with three choices. 
Firs t , Mr. Rose could remain as an employee with Allied, in the position of 
manager, but was required to quit school. Second, Mr. Rose could continue 
attending school. He must continue, however, to perform the same 
responsibilities previously required and must accept an approximate $500 per 
- 6 -
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month decrease in income, based on a change from a salary of $1,500 to an 
hourly wage. Third, Mr. Rose could terminate his employment and continue 
to attend college. Int . No. 12(a); D-41, line 11 through D-43, line 7; D-61, 
lines 3-8. In addition, Mr. Wetsel stated that he would be uncomfortable with 
Mr. Rose remaining as an employee because he would carry the same job 
responsibilities but be paid much less . D-42, lines 4-25; D-61, lines 3-8. 
Mr. Rose had previously understood that if he met the conditions 
expressly stated by Mr. Wetsel, his job was secure. D-60, lines 3-12. 
During the conversation concerning Mr. Rose's termination, Mr. Wetsel stated 
that flexibility was the basis of his decision. Mr. Rose informed Mr. Wetsel 
that he did not unders tand, that he and Mr. Wetsel had an agreement and he 
had complied with such agreement. Mr. Wetsel stated that he knew but TTve 
changed my mind." D-43, line 18 through D-44, line 8. Allied states that 
, ![f]or purposes of this motion only, [Mr. Rose's] allegation [that Allied 
discharged him] can treated as t r u e . " Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Facts, paragraph 13. 
I material to this case, Mr. Rose did fully and/or substantially 
perform all of AUied's job-related requirements. After the termination, 
Mr. Wetsel wrote and executed a reference letter for Mr. Rose. Such letter 
states that "[h]is attitude and performance in this position was commendable. 
We would recommend him for any position of this na tu re . " A copy of this 
letter is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
- 7 -
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In conjunction with the employment termination, Mr. Wetsel promised that 
Mr. Rose would receive the expected bonus to which he was entitled. Answer 
No. 28. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
ALLIED. 
Pursuant to Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to obtain a grant 
of summary judgment, Allied must prove that "that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." To satisfy such requirement, Allied's "showing must preclude all 
reasonable possibility that the loser could, if given a tr ial , produce evidence 
which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor." Bullock v . Deseret 
Dodge Truck Center, I n c . , 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559, 561 (1960). As 
demonstrated in this brief, Allied is not entitled to summary judgment against 
Willard Rose. There may be controverted issues of fact including the parties1 
statements basing the contract, the part ies ' intentions concerning such 
statements and the resulting understanding and agreements of the par t ies . 
Finally, Allied is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because 
authorities support Mr. Rose's entitlement to recover upon the legal theories 
of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, contractual wrongful discharge, 
tortious wrongful discharge, violation of public policy and breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Consequently, the lower 
court erred in granting summary judgment to Allied in contravention of this 
authority. 
- 8 -
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ARGUMENT 
II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MR. ROSE'S 
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT WAS TERMINABLE AT WILL. 
Point 1. 
Utah Law Required That Mr. Rose's Employment 
Contract Was Not Terminable At Will 
Utah law requires that an employment contract be terminable at will 
unless there is a contrary agreement, independent consideration, or other 
circumstances negating such terminability. 
Allied has argued that n [ t ]he Utah Supreme Court has consistently held 
that employment contracts which specify no duration are terminable at the will 
of either pa r ty . " Although this assertion is somewhat correct , Allied fails to 
recognize the exceptions created in this employment-at-will doctrine. Such 
exceptions have often been stated by the Utah Supreme Court. The court , in 
Bihlmaier v . Carson, 603 P.2d 790, 792 (Utah 1979), stated that 
Ltjhe general rule concerning personal employment contracts is , in 
the absence of some further express or implied stipulation as to the 
duration of the employment or of a good consideration in addition to 
the services contracted to be rendered, the contract is no more 
than an indefinite general hiring which is terminable at the will of 
either par ty . (Emphasis added. ) 
In addition, although the Bullock court did grant summary judgment in 
favor of defendant, it was careful to recognize that there was no contractual 
provision concerning duration of employment, there was no ambiguity that 
might suggest that the employment contract was not terminable at will, n [n ]o r 
does Bullock suggest that he could produce parol evidence to the contrary", 
and "there is definitely nothing to indicate that such provision existed by 
reason of estoppel." 354 P.2d at 562. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The following points to Argument II demonstrate that Mr. Rose falls 
i 
within the exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine because he did have 
a contrary agreement, independent consideration and other circumstances that 
negate the terminability s tandard. 
• • i 
Point 2 
Mr. Rose Had An Enforceable Employment Contract 
With Allied, Duration Of Which Could Not Be A 
Terminated On The Basis Of School 
Within the introduction to AUied's memorandum supporting its motion for 
summary judgment, Allied states that ! l[f]or purposes of this motion, < 
however, plaintiffTs version of the disputed facts will be accepted as t r u e . " 
As the statement of facts demonstrates, Mr. Rose sought an agreement with 
his supervisor that would grant him job security for protection against < 
termination on the basis of his college attendance. Mr. Rose discussed such 
attendance with Mr. Wetsel and was informed that such attendance would not 
be a problem as long as he met the conditions of fulfilling his average number j 
of hours per week, that Mr. Rose and the assistant manager would provide 
supervisory coverage over the sales floor and, expressly or impliedly, 
Mr. RoseTs job performance would remain satisfactory. Details of the < 
arrangement were negotiated between Mr. Rose and Mr. Wetsel during the 
second meeting when Mr. Rose, the assistant manager and Mr. Wetsel 
reviewed the schedules, Mr. Wetsel reinforced the imposed conditions and
 { 
Mr. Wetsel agreed that college attendance would not jeopardize Mr. Rose's 
position with Allied as long as such conditions were met. Although Allied or 
Mr. Wetsel did not expressly state that he would not fire Mr. Rose on the , 
basis of his college attendance, his statement that there would be no 
- 10 -
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difficulty caused by school, his imposed conditions, his conduct in reviewing 
the schedules and approving them, his subsequent conduct having absolutely 
no negative implications on Mr. Rose's college attendance and his general 
conduct concerning employees1 college attendance certainly created a promise 
on his par t that Mi Rose would not _, be fired «»n I he HJSIS of such 
attendance. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that "[a] 
promise may be stated in words either oral or written, or may be inferred 
wholly or partly from conduct." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4 
(1981). 
In addition, on the basis of such conditions and conduct, Mr. Rose was 
certainly under the reasonable assumption that Allied would not fire him on 
the basis of college attendance. "A promise is a manifestation of intention to 
act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee 
in understanding that a commitment has been made." Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts at § 2. 
Second, both parties provided consideration and, therefore, an 
enforceable contract resulted. AHied's consideration included Mr. Wetsel's 
promise, the giving up of the legal r ight to terminate Mr. Rose at will and 
substituting the promise that Mr. Rose's college attendance would not provide 
grounds for termination «:>£ his employment unless the express conditions were 
not met. Although Allied argues that Mr. Rose provided no consideration 
because he did not benefit Allied, Mr. Rose did provide consideration for the 
contract. Consideration not only includes the giving of a benefit, it also 
includes the incurring of a detriment. Petroleum Refractionating Corp. v . 
Kendrick Oil Co. , 65 F.2d 997, 998-99 (10th Cir. 1933) ("And where there is 
- 11 -
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a detriment to the promisee, there need be no benefit to the promisor .") ; 
Lampley v . Celebrity Homes, I n c . , 42 Colo. App. 359, 594 P.2d 605, 608 
(1979); Sugarhouse Finance Co. v , Anderson, 610 P,2d 1369, 1372 (Utah 
1980) (citing Petroleum Refractionating Corp . , 65 F.2d 997, to answer 
question whether promisor must receive benefit from promiseefs detriment, 
which is answered in the negative*); Man will v . Oyler, 11 Utah 2d 433, 
361 P.2d 177, 178 (1961); 17 Am. J u r . 2d Contracts § 96 ("sufficient 
consideration may consist either in some r ight , in teres t , profit, or benefit 
accruing to the one pa r ty , or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or 
responsibility given, suffered, or undertaken by the o t h e r . " ) ; 17 C . J . S . 
Contracts § 70. Relying on Allied1 s statements, and the agreements reached 
thereby, Mr. Rose did register at Westminister College as a full-time s tudent , 
did schedule his classes during times when he was available and not required 
to work for Allied, paid $1,645 for Fall 1982 tuition charges and $97.81 for 
books. Cearly, Mr. Rose thereby incurred substantial time and financial 
commitments resulting in the detriment required for the element of 
consideration. Fur ther , Mr. Rose forfeited the right to register for classes 
at any time of the day, and thereby provided consideration. See Stevens v . 
G. L. Rugo & Sons, I nc . , 209 F.2d 135, 139 n .2 (1st Cir. 1953) (employee 
gave consideration by giving up r ight to renew previous employment 
contract) . In addition, Mr. Rose was seeking a degree in business 
management. Such degree could have clearly benefited Allied through 
Mr. Rose's continued employment and his use of the knowledge obtained. 
As described above, Mr. Wetsel promised Mr. Rose that the employment 
with Allied would not terminate so long as the aforementioned conditions were 
met. In addition, Mr. Rose promised Mr. Wetsel that he would maintain an 
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approximate 45-hour work week and would provide supervisory sales floor 
coverage along with the assistant manager. Fur ther , Mr. Rose obtained 
Mr. WetseVs approval of his class schedule and, thereby, promised that he 
would be available for work at any time not inconsistent with said schedule. 
Mr. Wetselfs promise, in exchange for Mr. Rosefs promise, imposed obligations 
on both parties and were sufficient consideration to render the contract 
enforceable. DeFeyter v . Riley, 43 Colo. App. 299, 606 P.2d 453, 454 
(1979). 
Allied has previously argued that because Mr. Rose did not give up the 
right to quit, the contract lacks mutuality and, therefore, is not enforceable. 
Mutuality, however, only requires mutual consideration, not mutual 
obligations. Each party must give consideration. As stated, both Allied and 
Mr. Rose gave consideration by providing benefit and/or incurring detriment. 
If mutuality of obligation was required, no contract could be enforceable 
because the parties1 obligations are distinct. Each par ty bargains for 
something it does not have. Mutuality of obligation, therefore, cannot in all 
practical sense apply to any contract. Mr. Rose's failure to give up the 
right to quit Allied does not constitute lack of consideration or mutuality. 
Stevens, 209 F.2d at 138-39, 139 n . 2 . 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 79 (1981) states the rule that 
"[i]f the requirement of consideration is met, there is no additional 
requirement of (a) a gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a loss, 
disadvantage, or detriment to the promisee; or (b) equivalence in the values 
exchanged; or (c) Mutuality of obligation/" The Comment further explains 
that 
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[c]lause (c) of this Section negates any supposed requirement of 
Mutuality of obligation/ Such a requirement has sometimes been 
asserted in the form, rBoth parties must be bound or neither is 
bound.1 That statement is obviously erroneous as applied to an 
exchange of promise for performance; it is equally inapplicable to 
contracts governed by §§ 82-94 and to contracts enforceable by 
virtue of their formal characteristics under § 6. Even in the 
ordinary case of the exchange of promise for promise, § 78 makes it 
clear that voidable and unenforceable promises may be 
consideration. The only requirement of Mutuality of obligation1 
even in cases of mutual promises is that stated in §§ 76-77. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 79, Comment f (1981). 
Section 76, of the Restatement concerns conditional promises, of which 
the promisor knows the condition will not occur when the promise is made. 
Section 77 deals with illusory and alternative promises. Consequently, both 
§ 76 and § 77 are inapplicable to the present case. 
Pursuant to § 79, Restatement (Second) of Contracts , and Stevens, 
209 F.2d 135, therefore, mutuality of obligation is not required to create an 
enforceable contract between Mr. Rose and Allied. Consequently, the failure 
of Mr. Rose to give up the right to quit Allied is not relevant to these 
proceedings. Also, Pugh v . See's Candies, I n c . , 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 
171 Cal. Rptr . 917, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Toussaint v . Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1980). 
Allied has argued that Mr. Rose has not given consideration because the 
detriment he incurred was not pursuant to the request of Allied. Firs t , 
Mr. Rose promised that he would satisfy the aforementioned conditions at the 
request of Mr. Wetsel and in exchange for Mr. Wetsel's promise. Second, 
Mr. Rose gave up the r ight to arbitrarily determine his class schedule timing 
pursuant to the request , conditions imposed and approval of Mr. Wetsel. 
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Third, Mr. Rose then incurred detriment by relying on Mr. Wetsel* s promise 
and registering for college, including payment for tuition and books, and 
during the previously agreed times. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981) does require that for 
a performance or promise to constitute consideration it must be bargained for. 
The Restatement further explains that Tt[a] performance or re turn promise is 
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and 
is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise." Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 71(2) (1981). Mr. Rose sought Mr. Wetselfs promise 
that his college attendance would not jeopardize his position with Allied. In 
re turn for that promise, Mr. Wetsel sought a promise from Mr. Rose that he 
would maintain an average 45-hour work week and provide supervisory sales 
floor coverage along with the assistant manager. Fur ther , Mr. Wetsel sought 
Mr. Rose's promise that he would not register for classes at times other than 
on the approved schedule. Mr. Rose's promise to satisfy those conditions was 
given in exchange for Mr. WetselTs promise of job security during college 
attendance. Following the Restatement, Mr. Rose provided consideration to 
Allied. 
The Restatement also provides that the "performance may consist 
of . . . (b) a forbearance, or (c) the creation, modification, or destruction 
of a legal relation." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71(3). Mr. Wetsel, 
clearly, agreed to forbear from firing Mr. Rose on the basis of school, as 
long as the conditions were satisfied. In addition, Mr. Wetsel's promise did 
modify the legal relation of employer-employee by limiting AUiedTs reasons for 
terminating Mr. Rose. In conjunction, Mr. Rose promised to forbear from 
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requesting a shorter average work week, refusing to provide supervisory 
coverage, when not attending school, and to forbear from taking classes at 
times other than on the approved schedule. Said promise also resulted in a 
modification of the employer-employee relationship because Mr. Rose was 
committed to availability outside his school schedule and for an average 
45-hour work week. Previously, Mr. Rose had not been required to maintain 
availability on a set schedule. Mr. Rose promised that he would be available 
to work at times not inconsistent with the class schedule approved by 
Mr. Wetsel and, therefore, promised to forbear from taking classes at 
different times. Mr. Rose complied with said promise by registering for 
i 
classes within the time frames approved by Mr. Wetsel. His promise and 
performance was given to Allied. In addition, his performance was also given 
to Westminister College by so registering at the specified times. The 
i 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71(4) states that the performance or 
promise may be given to the promisor or to some other person. According to 
the Restatement, which is a restatement of the general law, Mr. Rose 
provided consideration to Allied and Allied gave consideration to Mr. Rose. 
Consequently, an enforceable contract was created whereby Allied could not 
terminate Mr. Rose's employment on the basis of school so long as Mr. Rose 
i 
satisfied his promised conditions. 
Allied has argued that Mr. Rose has not shown any promise regarding 
duration of his employment. Allied is correct in assert ing that Mr. Rose does 
not state a definite date through which his employment was secure. Allied 
has failed to note, however, the significance of the contract regarding 
duration of employment. The contract required Allied to forbear termination 
of Mr. Rose's employment on the basis of school, while Mr. Rose attended 
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college, as long as Mr. Rose complied with his promised conditions. The 
duration of the contract, therefore, was the period during which Mr. Rose 
attended college. Said period could have ended after Mr. Rose attended 
Westminister for one semester. Or the period may have continued for a 
couple years , at which time Mr. Rose would complete his college education and 
graduate. This was the period, and therefore, the duration, to which the 
parties bargained and agreed. Allied!s arguments concerning lack of duration 
are unfounded when considering the part ies ' agreement. 
In Farmer v . Arabian American Oil Co. , 277 F.2d 46, 51 (2nd Cir. 
1960), the court found that an oral contract was created and enforceable with 
the duration being "the duration of [employer's] oil operations in Saudi 
Arabia". The court held that the series of oral negotiations between the 
parties created the contract. Fur ther , because the employee testified that 
the parties orally agreed to the continuance of employment for the duration of 
the employer's Saudi Arabia operations, the contract would then terminate, 
and therefore, this was the contract duration. As in the present case, no 
specific date was necessary to determine contract duration. Many contracts 
terminate on the happening of some specified event, ra ther than a particular 
date. E . g . , Uniform Real Estate Contract (the closing on the home); 
Revolving Charge Account Contract (paying off the amount of purchase) ; 
Partnership Agreements (par tner ' s bankruptcy, incompetency or death) . 
Mr. Rose intended to protect his employment from termination on the 
basis of factors related to his college attendance. He solicited Allied1 s 
agreement that such attendance, and the time commitment involved therefor, 
would not jeopardize his employment. In r e tu rn , Mr. Wetsel, AUied's agent, 
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clearly implied, if not expressed, through the conditions mandated, that 
i 
Mr. Rose!s employment would not be terminated on the basis of such 
schooling. Mr. WetselTs intentions are clearly shown by his acknowledgement 
of the part ies ' agreement and his statement that he had changed his mind 
i 
concerning such agreement, made during the parties1 meeting when the 
discharge ultimatum was given. The parties1 statements and conduct clearly 
demonstrate mutual intentions concerning the agreement. Said agreement was 
i 
intended to provide that as long as Mr. Rose met the aforementioned 
conditions his employment would not be terminated on the basis of college 
attendance. 
Point 3 
Mr. Rose Incurred Independent Consideration Resulting 
In Lack Of Employment Terminability Based On School < 
As discussed in Point 2, Mr. Rose did provide consideration in exchange 
for Allied's promise and consideration, which created an enforceable oral 
agreement. Such agreement provided that as long as Mr. Rose met the 
conditions of working his average number of work hours per week and he and 
the assistant manager provided supervisory coverage of the sales floor, Allied 
i 
could not terminate Mr. Rose's employment during or on the basis of school. 
As explained, the primary consideration provided by Mr. Rose was his 
promise and the detriment he incurred through limitation on class schedule, 
time and financial commitments resulting from registration at Westminster 
College. Consequently, this detrimental consideration was outside the realm 
of the employment services Mr. Rose was required to perform for Allied. It 
i 
was, therefore, independent consideration. Pugh v . See's Candies, I n c . , 
116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr . 917, 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). The 
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rendered" negates the at-will terminability generally implied in an employment 
contract in Utah. Bihlmaier, 603 P.2d at 792. 
Point 4 
Allied Was Estopped From Terminating Mr. RoseTs 
Employment Without Good Cause And/Or 
On The Basis Of School 
Mr. Rose sought out AUiedTs agreement that college attendance would not 
jeopardize his employment. Mr. Wetsel, Allied's agent, expressly stated the 
conditions that Mr. Rose was required to satisfy to obtain such an agreement. 
In addition, Mr. Wetsel1 s conduct clearly implied a promise, an agreement, 
that as long as the conditions were met Mr. Rose's employment would not be 
terminated because of his schooling. Finally, Mr. Wetsel approved Mr. Rosefs 
class schedule as not creating difficulties with his employment. When a 
person informs another that as long as certain conditions are met there will 
be no difficulty caused by school attendance, and when the informing party 
discusses, reviews and approves the details concerning such conduct, the 
class scheduling, it is certainly reasonable for the second party to believe 
that his conduct will not jeopardize his employment position with the informing 
par ty . 
'Here there is no actual 'meeting of the minds1; and yet there may 
be a valid contract. Interpret ing the elliptical expressions of the 
par t ies , the court may find that the expressions, interpreted in the 
light of the surrounding facts, made the understanding of one of 
the parties reasonable and made it unreasonable for the other par ty 
not to know that such would be the first par ty ' s understanding. 
In such a case there is a contract in accordance with that 
understanding. The second par ty having negligently or 
intentionally misled the first , is bound by es toppe l / 
Bullock, 354 P.2d at 562 n .5 (quoting 3 Corbin on Contracts, 685, § 684). 
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The discussions between Mr. Rose and Mr. Wetsel, in conjunction with 
the parties1 concurrent and subsequent conduct, resulted in a reasonable 
understanding on Mr. Rose's par t that his college attendance would not 
jeopardize his employment with Allied. Allied's primary reason for 
discharging Mr. Rose was the lack of flexibility in Mr. Rose's schedule. 
Such lack of flexibility was based on Mr. Rose's class schedule, which 
Mr. Wetsel had expressly approved. Mr. Wetsel should have anticipated this 
lack of flexibility when he approved Mr. Rose's class schedule. 
Consequently, it was not a justifiable reason for discharge. Stevens, 
209 F.2d at 140. Mr. Wetsel provided Mr. Rose with a very complimentary 
reference letter concerning future employment. The let ter states that 
Mr. Rose's job performance was more than satisfactory. In addition, 
Mr. Rose also believes that his performance was satisfactory to Allied. If 
Allied wishes to negate the conclusions that Mr. Rose's performance was 
satisfactory and, therefore, there was just cause for termination of 
Mr. Rose's employment, Allied must argue controverted material facts, 
resulting in its lack of entitlement to a summary judgment. Id. 
Allied attempts to negate the satisfactory performance by supplying 
affidavits of Johny Wetsel and Donna Wetsel. The affidavits, however, do not 
contradict the recommendation letter executed by Johny D. Wetsel. Such 
letter states that "[h]is attitude and performance in this position was 
commendable. We would recommend him for any position of this na tu re . " 
Firs t , if Mr. Wetsel did not believe that Mr. Rose's performance was 
commendable, he should not have had the letter prepared or executed said 
let ter . Second, the affidavit of Johny D. Wetsel states that "the statement 
that Mr. Rose's attitude was commendable is correct ." While the affidavit 
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attempts to explain away the complimentary recommendation let ter , by 
providing an alleged reason for its execution, which is controverted by 
Mr. Rose, the reason for execution is not relevant. The statements contained 
therein express the fact of Mr. RoseTs satisfactory performance. 
Mr. WetseFs affidavit further supports the factual statements and legal 
theories of Mr. Rose. Mr. Rose argues that although Mr. Wetsel approved 
his class schedule during the agreement reached between the par t ies , 
Mr. Wetsel fired Mr. Rose on the lack of flexibility caused by such schedule, 
contrary to and in breach of the agreement. Mr. Wetsel* s affidavit states 
that f t[t]he difficulties arose when his school began to take so much of his 
time that he could not be present at the necessary times to meet his job 
responsibilities." The only times during which Mr. Rose could not be present 
were previously approved by Mr. Wetsel when he approved the class 
schedule. Consequently, in derogation of the parties1 agreement, Mr. Wetsel 
fired Mr. Rose on the basis of his college attendance, not because his job 
performance was unsatisfactory. 
As discussed in Point 2, each party made promises. Allied and 
Mr. Wetsel did or should have reasonably expected his promise to Mr. Rose to 
induce Mr. RoseTs registration in college. Such promise did induce Mr. Rose 
to register at Westminister College. Finally, Allied and Mr. Wetsel terminated 
Mr. Rose in contravention of such promise and injustice can be avoided only 
by enforcement of the promise. Consequently, Allied is also estopped from 
denying such promise on the basis of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981). 
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The lower court1 s order granting Allied summary judgment clearly 
contravenes the weight of authority and the facts of this case. Said 
authority and facts clearly demonstrate that Mr. Rose and Allied entered into 
a contract which Allied breached. 
ARGUMENT 
-•' III ' 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MR. ROSE IS 
NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER AGAINST ALLIED PURSUANT TO 
THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL. 
As discussed in Point 4 of Argument II , § 90, Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts (1981), defines the action of promissory estoppel. To satisfy the 
elements of § 90, "the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the par t of the promisee", the promise must actually "induce 
such action or forbearance", and upon such inducement, the promise "is 
binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise." 
Section 90 generally requires a promise, a promisor that should reasonably 
expect reliance on the promise, actual reliance on the promise, such reliance 
must be detrimental and lack of enforcement of the promise would cause 
injustice. 
As discussed above, Mr. Wetsel promised Mr. Rose that college 
attendance would not jeopardize his employment as long as Mr. Rose complied 
with the stated conditions. Mr. Wetsel then approved Mr. Rose's class 
schedule as meeting the conditions. Mr. Rose was induced by the promise to 
register in college. Consequently, he actually relied on the promise. As 
discussed above, such reliance was reasonable in light of the statements and 
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circumstances surrounding the events . The reliance was detrimental in that 
it actually resulted in the termination of Mr. RoseTs employment in 
contravention of such promise. In addition, Mr. Rose could not subsequently 
obtain unemployment benefits. He had registered in school in reliance on 
Mr. Wetselfs promise, however, contrary to the benefits1 requirements, 
Mr. Rose had not earned the major portion of his earnings while attending 
college. Mr. Rose has suffered substantial financial difficulties, all caused by 
the breach of Mr. Wetsel!s promise. Clearly, Allied should be estopped from 
denying this promise and the promise should be enforced to compensate 
Mr. Rose for the injustice resulting from such breach. Mr. Rose would not 
have registered at Westminster College, if Mr. Wetsel had not promised that 
his employment would be secure. Mr. Rose suffered from the payment of 
tuition, the loss of his job and salary commensurate therewith. Promissory 
estoppel, clearly, must apply to the present case. The lower court , 
therefore, granted summary judgment to Allied contrary to the law. 
ARGUMENT 
IV 
MR. ROSE IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER UNDER THE THEORY OF 
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE. 
Point 1. 
The Utah Supreme Court Should Adhere To The 
Recent Evolution In Employment Contract Law To 
Expand The Rights Of Employees 
As demonstrated above, the Utah Supreme Court has always provided 
exceptions to the general rule that employment contracts are terminable at 
will. Such exceptions are followed by the overwhelming authority of other 
jurisdictions. Recently, several jurisdictions have expanded, combined and 
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re-entitled these exceptions to fall within the theory of wrongful discharge. 
As reported in the December issue of Trial, "some ten states have been 
prepared to modify the at will concept in one way or another through 
holdings or dicta", "[l]ess definite expressions of a willingness to revise the 
doctrine in appropriate circumstances are found in eight more states" and 
"four states can be classified as accepting or stating they would accept 
modifications in certain situations". Lawless, Wrongful Discharge, The 
Employer's Duty of Good Faith, December 1982 Trial 54, 56 (hereinafter 
Wrongful Discharge). In the Pacific region, California and Oregon are 
definitely changing the at-will concept. Colorado, Idaho and Montana are 
listed as express possibilities for change and Washington has changed this 
concept in certain circumstances. Arizona is apparently the only Pacific 
reporting state that has recently reaffirmed the at-will concept as defined by 
very early authority. 
The United States Supreme Court decisions have undermined any 
constitutional basis for the employment-at-will doctrine. Wrongful Dishcarge, 
supra , at 55-56. In reinterpret ing this doctrine, courts have recognized the 
employee's lack of bargaining power and the societal importance of stability in 
the job market. Recently, such stability has gained added importance 
because of the high rate of unemployment and the comparatively high number 
of people being supported by unemployment benefits, welfare and other 
government aid. 
The wrongful discharge cause of action merely takes the exceptions to 
the at-will doctrine, including express or implied contrary agreements, 
independent consideration, the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in 
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every contract; combines these exceptions with other theories of recovery, 
including interference with contract, interference with business relations, 
some conspiracy causes of action and several tortious bad faith claims; adds 
the recognition that employees must receive some judicial protection for 
justified expectations of an employer and re-entitles all of this as the doctrine 
of wrongful discharge. Such expansion of employees1 r ights does not entirely 
negate the employment-at-will doctrine and the rulings of the Utah Supreme 
Court. It merely reemphasizes values, combines the many exceptions and 
causes of action, seeks to reinforce the societal importance of job security 
and desires to terminate substantial confusion resulting from the crossover of 
claims and remedies. See Bakaly, Erosion of the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 
1982 J . Contemp. L. 63 (Utah); Harper, Expanding Liability for Employment 
Termination, December 1982 Trial 60; Bourhis, Recognition and Recovery for 
Bad Faith Tor ts , December 1982 Trial 47; Wrongful Discharge, supra. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not ruled on the doctrine of wrongful 
discharge, its expansion of employees1 r igh ts , the combination and 
clarification of the many theories under which employees have previously 
litigated and the many exceptions to such theories, either negatively or 
affirmatively. These expansions, however, do not expressly contravene the 
Court rs rulings. They simply reinterpret and expand on many of the 
exceptions and theories under which the Utah Supreme Court has provided 
that employment contracts are not terminable at will. 
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Point 2 
Mr. Rose Is Entitled To Recover Under Wrongful 
Discharge On The Implied Contract Basis 
As discussed above, the Utah Supreme Court has provided an exception 
to the employment-at-will doctrine concerning contrary express or implied 
agreements. In addition, Argument II demonstrates that Mr. Rose and Allied 
had reached such a contrary express or implied agreement providing that 
Allied would not terminate Mr. RoseTs employment on the basis of his college 
attendance, so long as Mr. Rose met the aforementioned conditions, without 
just cause. 
Toussaint v . Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880 
(Mich. 1980), is factually analogous to the present case. The cases of 
Toussaint and Ebling v . Masco Corporation were consolidated on an appeal to 
the Supreme Court of Michigan. Both cases involved litigation initiated by 
employees against their employers for wrongful discharge based on breach of 
employment contracts having indefinite periods of duration but provisions 
requiring good cause for termination. In both cases, the employees had 
asked about job security and reasons for discharge. Both were informed that 
the employers did not discharge, except for cause or good cause. At the end 
of the trial, juries awarded verdicts to both plaintiffs. The Court of Appeals 
then reversed Toussaint and affirmed Ebling. Both cases were appealed to 
the Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed Ebling 
and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals concerning Toussaint, 
thereby reinstating the jury verdict . Toussaint was employed in a middle 
management position with Blue Cross for five years and Ebling was similarly 
employed by Masco for two years . 
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The Michigan Supreme Court recognized the general rule that t nin the 
absence of distinguishing features or provisions or a consideration in addition 
to the services to be rendered, such contracts are indefinite tarings, 
terminable at the will of either par ty . 1 " 292 N.W.2d at 883 (quoting Lynas v . 
Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 687, 273 N.W. 315 (1937)). It then declared, 
however, that such rule was merely a rule of construction and not a 
substantive limitation on the enforceability of employment contracts . Id. at 
884. The oral statements alleged by the plaintiffs as creating oral contracts 
were that the employees would be with the company as long as they did their 
jobs. In addition, the plaintiffs provided as evidence of the employers1 
agreements to discharge only for cause, the employers1 written policy 
statements. 
Firs t , the Toussaint court held that : 
1) a provision of an employment contract providing that an 
employee shall not be discharged except for cause is legally 
enforceable although the contract is not for a definite term - the 
term is 'indefinite, ' and 
2) such a provision may become par t of the contract either 
by express agreement, oral or written, or as a result of an 
employee's legitimate expectations grounded in an employees policy 
statements. 
3) in Toussaint, as in Ebling, there was sufficient evidence 
of an express agreement to justify submission to the ju ry . 
292 N.W.2d at 885. 
Pursuant to the Toussaint holding, Mr. Rose has a cause of action for 
wrongful discharge. Mr. Wetsel certainly promised that Mr. Rosefs schooling 
would not cause employment termination as long as the conditions were met, 
thus limiting the cause Allied could use to fire Mr. Rose. As in Toussaint, 
the provision limiting cause for termination "is legally enforceable [even if] 
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the contract is not for a definite term". 292 N.W.2d at 885. The provision 
concerning cause limitation "may become par t of the contract either by 
express agreement, oral or writ ten, or as a result of an employee's legitimate 
expectations grounded in an employer's policy statements." Id. As 
demonstrated above, the cause limitation became a par t of the contract 
through the express oral agreement between Mr. Rose and Mr. Wetsel. In 
addition, the agreement, the conduct of the parties during and subsequent to 
said agreement "and AUied's policies concerning termination and discipline, 
including the allowance of other employees' college attendance, requires that 
the cause limitation be a par t of the contract according to Mr. Rose's 
legitimate expectations. 
Finally, according to Toussaint, the lower court erred in grant ing 
summary judgment to Allied because Mr. Rose has offered "sufficient evidence 
of an express agreement to justify submission to the j u ry . " 292 N.W.2d at 
885. 
Although in the present case, Allied attempts to argue that Mr. Rose 
cannot recover because of lack of mutuality of obligation, the Toussaint court 
expressly ruled that enforceability of a contract does not depend upon 
mutuality of obligation. 292 N.W.2d at 885. In discussing the determination 
of the contract duration, the court recognized that such duration was found 
"from written or oral communications between the par t ies , usages of t r ade , 
the type of employment, and other circumstances." Id. at 886. As is 
apparent , these factors are generally used to determine any term of any 
contract. 
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In the present case, as expressed and implied from the parties1 
statements, conduct and other circumstances, Mr. Rose and Mr. Wetsel agreed 
that Mr. Rose's job would not be jeopardized on the basis of his schooling so 
long as he met the conditions imposed by Mr. Wetsel. In addition, "[a] large 
number of Allied's employees attend college or other schools." Int . No. 5. 
Allied has long allowed such college attendance and has not had a policy for 
termination therefor. Finally, Allied has provided its employees with a list of 
factors resulting in discipline or termination. Such list provides eleven 
"terminable out of bounds" items which may subject an employee to immediate 
discharge. In addition, the list provides "operational out-of-bounds" which 
may subject an employee to discipline, although generally short of discharge. 
A copy of this list is attached hereto, as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein 
by this reference. None of the examples set forth on this list require 
non-college attendance. In light of Mr. Wetsel!s imposed conditions, approval 
of Mr. Rose's class schedule as meeting such conditions, AUied's large number 
of employees attending college and this list of reasons for termination or 
discipline, Mr. Rose was certainly under the legitimate expectation and 
understanding that Allied would not require him to forgo his schooling or 
terminate his employment for reasons concerning such college attendance. 
Toussaint held that "an employer's express agreement to terminate only 
for cause, or statements of company policy and procedure to that effect, can 
give rise to rights enforceable in contract ." 292 N.W.2d at 890. Such 
agreement to terminate only for cause is similar to the agreement in the 
present case. Mr. Wetsel imposed conditions on Mr. Rose to obtain the job 
security that he requested. Upon promising to meet such conditions, 
pursuing a class schedule that allowed compliance with these conditions and 
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obtaining Mr. Wetsel1 s approval of this class schedule, an express agreement 
i 
to not terminate Mr. Rose on the basis of his school and the time involved 
therefor, as long as the aforementioned conditions were met, resulted. As 
stated by the Toussaint court , 
i 
suppose the contracts here were writ ten, not oral, . . . [t]o 
construe such an agreement as terminable at the will of the 
employer would be tantamount to saying . . . that a contract of 
indefinite duration 'cannot be made other than terminable at will by 
a provision that states that an employee will not be discharged 
except for cause1.
 { 
Id. at 890-91. 
As in Toussaint, Mr. Rose was hired for a responsible position. In 
addition, he negotiated specifically regarding job securi ty. If Mr. Wetsel had 
not intended that Mr. Rose pursue his schooling, or had not expressly 
reviewed and approved the class schedule, and had wanted more flexibility 
from Mr. Rose than his schooling would allow, Mr. Wetsel could have then 
informed Mr. Rose of his intentions and negated any misunderstandings 
between the par t ies . Mr. Wetsel, however, did not tell Mr. Rose of any such 
intentions. Contrary thereto, Mr. Wetsel imposed the conditions, approved 
Mr. Rose's schedule and even wished him well in his pursui t . If Allied 
continues to argue that no agreement was reached between the par t ies , there 
is a question of material fact which requires determination by a jury . ' 
292 N.W.2d at 897 n .39. The controverted factual question, therefore, was 
not one for determination on a motion for summary judgment. 
< 
In addition, the Toussaint court rules that employer's statements of 
policy 
can give rise to contractual r ights in employees without evidence ^ 
that the parties mutually agreed that the policy statements would 
create contractual r ights in the employee . . . and although no 
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reference was made to the policy statement in pre-employment 
interviews and the employee does not learn of its existence until 
after his hiring. 
292 N.W.2d at 892. 
The court reasoned that when the employer creates policies, he 
contemplates mutual adherence to the policies and receives benefits from a 
cooperative and loyal work force on the basis of those policies. Because of 
the expectation of mutual cooperation, the employer's policies are enforceable 
and the employee has provided consideration by providing the benefit 
expected and obtained by the employer, 292 N.W.2d at 892-93; Lampley, 
594 P.2d at 608. Although the oral contracts and policies discussed in 
Toussaint were somewhat more general than in the present case, as 
concerning a provision for just cause, the specificity provided in the 
agreement between Mr. Rose and Mr. Wetsel, from the imposed conditions and 
the approval of the class schedule, can only create a stronger case for 
Mr. Rose regarding wrongful discharge. AlliedTs policy to allow employees' 
college attendance increases the s trength of Mr. Rose's case. 
In the present case, the parties discussed and negotiated terms for the 
contract. In addition, as demonstrated by Exhibit "E", Allied published 
reasons for termination and discipline to its employees, none of which include 
college attendance. Fur ther , Allied has a long standing policy allowing its 
employees to attend college. Consequently, Allied has a policy against firing 
employees for furthering their education. Allied expected mutual adherence 
to its policies and received benefits from a cooperative and loyal work force. 
AlliedTs expectation of mutual cooperation made its policies enforceable. 
Pursuant to Toussaint, Mr. Rose provided consideration for enforcement of 
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said policies by providing the benefit expected and obtained by Allied. 
( 
292 N.W.2d at 892-93. 
As discussed in Toussaint, the United States Supreme Court, in Perry 
v . Sindermann, 408 U.S . 593, 601-03 (1972), found that not only could a 
written express contract provide entitlement to continuation of employment 
unless sufficient cause for discharge is found, but also tfTthe law of contracts 
in most, if not all, jurisdictions long has employed a process by which 
agreements, though not formalized in writing, may be T implied"Tt. 292 N.W.2d 
at 894 (quoting Perry v . Sindermann, 408 U.S . at 601-03). The United 
States Supreme Court further stated that t t ![e]xplicit contractual provisions 
may be supplemented by other agreements implied from Tthe promisor1 s words 
and conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances.1 Mf Id. Finally, 
the court stated that an employee can show through circumstances and other 
relevant facts that he has a legitimate claim of entitlement to job tenure , in 
the present case, job securi ty. 
i 
Finally, in Toussaint, the court determined and held that many questions 
in wrongful discharge cases are for the jury 's resolution. These questions 
include the question of breach of contract, the question of just cause, the 
question of whether the employee committed the employer's claimed specific 
misconduct and the question concerning the contested reason for discharge. 
292 N.W.2d at 895-96. 
In Cleary v . American Airlines, I n c . , I l l Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. 
Rptr . 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), the California court discussed the history of 
employment contract law and the emerging wrongful discharge cause of action. 
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The court recognized that California had a statute providing that employment 
contracts were terminable at will. The court notes that the legislature 
enacted the statute because it thought that if an employee could terminate his 
employment relationship at will, the employer also should be so entitled. It 
recognized, however, that "when viewed in the context of present-day 
economic reality and the joint, reasonable expectations of employers and their 
employees, the freedom1 bestowed by the rule of law on the employee may 
indeed by fictional." Id. at 725. In addition, "the rule applied in its pures t 
form easily leads to harsh results for the employee." Id. It then noted that 
the at-will doctrine was subject to exceptions, including the independent 
consideration exception discussed in Argument II , Point 3, supra . Fur ther , 
the court stated that an employer could be subject to damages for terminating 
at-will employment "!when the employee was engaged contractually to serve so 
long as he performed to the satisfaction of the employer1". Id. at 726 
(quoting Patterson v . Philco Corp . , 252 Cal. App. 2d 63, 65, 60 Cal. Rptr . 
110 (1967)). 
In the present economy and case, employees, particularly Mr. Rose, lack 
the freedom that the employment-at-will doctrine was intended to give 
employees. In addition "the rule applied [to Mr. Rose] in its pures t form 
easily leads to harsh resul ts" . 168 Cal. Rptr . at 725. In the context of the 
parties1 discussions and agreements, it is clear that both parties intended the 
understanding that Mr. Rose's college attendance, during the time periods 
specified in the approved class schedule, would not constitute cause for 
dismissal. Lack of flexibility because of the approved scheduling, however, 
was the exact cause for employment termination. Such dismissal, therefore, 
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did create in Mr. Rose an action for wrongful discharge pursuant to the 
language in Cleary. 
The Cleary court then discussed three recent cases illustrating "the 
i 
increasing reluctance of the courts to allow termination of employment 
relationships without imposition of liability when it is deemed appropriate ." 
168 Cal. Rptr . at 727. The court therein recognized that "'employment 
contracts , like other agreements, should be construed to give effect to the 
intention of the parties as demonstrated by the language used, the purpose to 
be accomplished and the circumstances under which the agreement was 
I 
made.1" Id. at 727 (quoting Drzewiecki v . H & R Block, I n c . , 24 Cal. App. 
3d 695, 703-04, 101 Cal. Rptr . 169 (1972)). FinaUy, the Cleary court noted 
"the continuing t rend toward recognition by the courts and the Legislature of 
certain implied contract r ights to job securi ty, necessary to insure social 
stability in our society." Id. at 729. As discussed in Cleary, and 
otherwise, economic conditions, the change of values concerning employment 
i 
and the permanency thereof and the difference in bargaining power between 
the employer and the employee have kindled the legislative and judicial t rend 
towards providing protection for the employee. The Utah legislature has 
i 
recognized workers1 inability to exercise actual liberty of contract , to protect 
their freedom of labor and to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of 
employment within the employment contract. Utah Code Ann. § 34-19-1(3) 
(providing for the ability of an employee to organize and choose its 
representat ive) . In addition, the Utah legislature declared that it is this 
state1 s policy to protect and promote not only the employer's in teres t , but 
also the employee's interests and the public's in teres ts . Such interests 
include "regular and adequate income for the employee, and uninterrupted 
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production of goods and services". Id. at § 34-20-1(1), (2) (policy 
concerning employment relations and collective bargaining) . Fur ther , the 
legislature provides that "[negot ia t ion of terms and conditions of work should 
result from voluntary agreement between employer and employee." Id. at 
(3 ) . Although these statutes are not expressly applicable to the present 
case, they demonstrate the Utah legislative recognition that employees1 r ights 
need to and must be protected. Finally, the Utah Constitution provides that 
"[ t ]he rights of labor shall have just protection through laws calculated to 
promote the industrial welfare of the State ." Utah Const. Art. XVI, § 1. 
An employee's r ight to require compliance with agreements, understandings 
and policies between the employee and the employer would promote the 
industrial welfare of Utah. Such r ights provide feelings of satisfaction, 
cooperativeness and productivity while negating feelings of helplessness and 
insecurity. According to these legislative pronouncements, Mr. Rose had the 
right to contract with Allied and Allied is responsible for the breach of such 
contract. 
The California court further defined the wrongful discharge cause of 
action in Pugh v . Seefs Candies, I nc . , 116 Cah App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr . 
917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). The court recognized that even the at-will 
doctrine did not give the employer absolute r ight to terminate the employee. 
The two relevant limiting principles were public policy and traditional contract 
doctrine, "when the discharge is contrary to the terms of the agreement, 
express or implied." Id. at 922. Fur ther , the court stated that "[a] 
contract which limits the power of the employer with respect to the reasons 
for termination is no less enforceable because it places no equivalent limits 
upon the power of the employee to quit his employment." Id. at 924. Again, 
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although in the present case Allied argues that Mr. Rose cannot enforce his 
i 
agreement with Allied because of lack of mutuality of obligation, such 
mutuality is not required. The agreement between Mr. Rose and Allied did 
limit the power of the employer to terminate Mr. Rose with respect to the 
reasons for termination. That contract is no less enforceable because 
Mr. Rose did not give up the right to quit his employment. 
The Pugh court also discussed the independent consideration exception. 
It held that such exception provided an evidentiary function because "it is 
more probable that the parties intended a continuing relationship, with 
limitations upon the employer's dismissal authority, when the employee has 
provided some benefit to the employer, or suffers some detriment, beyond the 
usual rendition of service." 171 Cal. Rptr . at 925. As discussed above, in 
the present case Mr. Rose clearly suffered detriment through commitment of 
time and financial resources to his schooling and the forbearance from 
registering in classes during times other than on the approved schedule, in 
reliance on Mr. Wetsel's promises. In addition, his sought after degree was 
business management, which could have substantially benefited Allied. 
The Pugh court held that agreements limiting the reason for termination 
could be expressed or implied, and could be implied-in-fact or implied-in-law. 
Factors creating an implied-in-fact promise included "the personnel policies or 
practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of service, actions or 
communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued 
employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is 
engaged." 171 Cal. Rptr . at 925-26. In addition, the employer's conduct 
could give rise to an implied promise that it would not act arbitrarily towards 
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its employees. Id. at 927. Other factors to consider were commendations and 
promotions the employee received, lack of direct criticism, assurances he was 
given, the totality of the parties1 relationship and the acts and conduct of the 
par t ies , interpreted according to the subject matter and surrounding 
circumstances. Id. The implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing inherent in every contract can imply a promise contrary to termination 
at will. Id. at 926. Such covenant is discussed in Point 3, infra. 
Through the parties1 statements and conduct, in light of the 
circumstances and subject matter, Mr. Rose and Mr. Wetsel certainly reached 
an express or implied-in-fact agreement that Allied would not terminate 
Mr. Rosefs job because of his schooling. In addition, because Mr. Wetsel 
expressly approved the class schedule of Mr. Rose, he knew when Mr. Rose 
would be absent from work and expressly agreed thereto. Allied, therefore, 
reached an express or implied-in-fact agreement that Mr. Rose!s job would not 
be terminated because he was not available at those specific times. 
Consequently, the lack-of-flexibility reason for termination did breach said 
agreement. Allied must be held liable for its breach. 
Point 3 
Mr. Rose Is^  Entitled To Recover Under Wrongful 
Discharge For The Violation Of The Covenant 
Of Good Faith And Fair Dealing 
"Every contract imposes upon each par ty a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in its performance and its enforcement." Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 205 (1981). Also, Cleary, 168 Cal. Rptr . at 728; Fortune v . 
National Cash Register Co. , 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 1977); Erosion 
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of the Employment At-Will Doctrine, supra , at 75; Recognition and Recovery 
for Bad Faith Tor t s , supra , at 47-48. This covenant is implied in every 
contract as a matter of law. Pugh, 171 Cah Rptr . at 926. The covenant 
requires " ' that neither par ty will do anything which will injure the right of 
the other to receive the benefits of the agreement / " Recognition and 
Recovery for Bad Faith Tor t s , supra , at 47 (quoting Brown v . Superior 
Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 546, 212 P.2d 931 (1949)). The breach of this 
covenant entitles the damaged par ty to a cause of action in contract and/or 
tor t . Id. Said breach gives rise to a tortious cause of action because it is a 
breach of the duty growing out of the contract ra ther than a breach of 
promise set forth within the contract. Id. at 48 (quoting Tameny v . Atlantic 
Richfield Co. , 27 Cal. 3d 167, 175, 164 Cal. Rptr . 839, 610 P.2d 1330 
(1980)). The tort cause of action also follows from the purpose of the law of 
tor t s , to compensate individuals who are injured by the unreasonable conduct 
of another. Id. (quoting Wagner v . Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 34, 
161 Cal. Rptr . 516 (1980)). 
Good faith has been defined in several ways. In the Uniform Commercial 
Code it is defined as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction 
concerned." Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(19). Also, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-1-201(19). Good faith "emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common 
purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other pa r ty" . 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205, Comment a. Mr. Wetsel told 
Mr. Rose that he had no difficulty with Mr. Rose pursuing his college 
education so long as certain conditions were met. In addition, Mr. Wetsel 
approved the class scheduling as meeting the aforementioned conditions. 
Subsequently, Mr. Rose's employment with Allied was terminated on the 
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primary basis of lack of flexibility because of such schedule. Clearly, by 
requiring such flexibility after expressly approving the lack thereof, 
Mr. Wetsel did injure the r ight of Mr. Rose to receive benefits of their 
agreement. In addition, Mr. Wetsel!s conduct certainly did not demonstrate 
faithfulness to the agreed common purpose or consistency with the justified 
expectations of Mr. Rose. Mr. Wetsel was very aware of his and Mr. Rose's 
statements, conduct and Mr. Rosefs understandings concerning the part ies ' 
agreement. Mr. Wetsel's termination of Mr. Rose's employment with Allied was 
a conscious disregard of Mr. Rose's r ights concerning this agreement. 
Because of this conscious disregard, Allied not only acted unreasonable, but 
also should be subject to an award of punitive damages favoring Mr. Rose. 
Recognition and Recovery for Bad Faith Tor ts , supra , at 49. 
In Fortune v . National Cash Register Co. , 364 N.E.2d 1251, the court 
implied the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a written contract that 
was terminable at will, without cause, by either par ty on written notice. 
Plaintiff was a salesman and was fired just prior to obtaining bonuses and 
commissions. The court found that it was bad faith to terminate the salesman 
before paying all of the commissions earned. The employer was aware that 
the salesman had a right to the commissions and consciously disregarded such 
right by terminating the employee and refusing to pay such commissions. In 
the present case, Mr. Wetsel was aware of the express agreement and the 
understanding reached between the par t ies . He, also, was aware that 
Mr. Rose would be receiving a bonus. Upon termination of the employment, 
Mr. Wetsel promised that Mr. Rose would receive this bonus. Mr. Rose, 
however, has not received any such bonus. Allied acted in conscious 
disregard, or at least unreasonable, regarding the understandings and 
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agreements between Mr. Rose and Mr. Wetsel. Mr. Rose was subjected to the 
humiliation resulting from his employment termination, the financial problems 
caused by the firing and ineligibility for unemployment benefits, the inability 
to satisfactorily support his family and the emotional turmoil of attempting to 
meet his responsibilities to his family and others while working temporary jobs 
in areas other than those in which Mr. Rose is trained. 
Allied either did not act honestly in fact " with Mr. Rose or acted 
unreasonably and in conscious disregard of Mr. Rose's r igh t s . Mr. Wetsel 
stated that Mr. Rose's college attendance would cause no difficulty with his 
job and he approved Mr. Rose's class schedule. He then, however, 
terminated such employment because of lack of flexibility, caused by 
Mr. Rose's school, and thereby denied the ability of Mr. Rose to obtain the 
benefits of his bargain. Allied, therefore, did violate the covenant implying 
a duty of good faith and fair dealing and must be held liable therefor. 
As seen in Cleary, 168 Cal. Rptr . at 727-28, the cause of action for 
wrongful discharge includes breach of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. In addition, when "an employee's action for wrongful discharge 
is founded in tort as well as in contract, . . . the employer may be subject 
to liability for both compensatory and punitive damages." Id. at 728. 
Contrary to the summary judgment granted in favor of Allied, the law 
supports Mr. Rose's recovery of compensatory and punitive damages arising 
from Allied's breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
- 40 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
821 
Point 4 
Mr. Rose Is Entitled To Recover Under The 
Theory Of Wrongful Discharge For Allied* s 
Violation Of Public Policy 
As discissed above, the Utah legislature has enunciated a policy to 
protect the rights of labor, employees, in contract negotiations and 
representation. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-19-1(3); 34-20-1(1), (2 ) . 
Although such statutes do not expressly apply to the present case, they 
demonstrate a legislative recognition of the importance of protecting employees 
because they lack bargaining power. In addition, the Utah Constitution also 
provides protection for the r ights of labor. Utah Const. Art . XVI, § 1. 
Allied entered into an agreement with Mr. Rose that Mr. Rose's job 
would not be threatened by his college education so long as the conditions 
were met. At the very least, Allied misled Mr. Rose concerning such job 
security and knew or should have known that he was so misleading Mr. Rose. 
Pursuant to the protections afforded by the Utah legislature concerning 
employees1 r ights to negotiation and representation, AUied's violation of the 
agreement with Mr. Rose and refusal to recognize the r ights Mr. Rose 
obtained in said agreement, violates this public policy concerning protection 
of employees1 r ight to contract. Such violation was incurred through 
Mr. Wetsel!s bad faith, conscious disregard and unreasonable actions in 
"changing his mind" concerning the agreement reached with Mr. Rose. 
It is vitally important to require employers1 compliance with agreements 
entered into with employees. Such compliance will provide stability and 
productivity in the work force, resulting in a positive industrial welfare of 
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this s tate. The Utah legislature enacted the statutes concerning an 
employees1 r ight to bargain and contract with an employer. Clearly, the 
legislation was a response to the employee's lack of bargaining power and 
control in the present day economic climate. The Utah legislature recognized 
the importance of job stability to an employee and the necessity of allowing 
the employee some s t rength to negotiate toward needed terms in the 
employment contract. In addition, the Utah Constitutional provision 
demonstrates this state fs recognition of the significant r ights involved between 
an employee and employer and requires protections for those r igh t s . 
These provisions clearly enunciate a Utah policy of grant ing and 
protecting the employee's r ight to contract with an employer. Mr. Rose 
entered into negotiations which culminated in a contract with his employer. 
AUied's subsequent termination of Mr. Rose's employment was in complete 
derogation of the part ies ' contract . This absolute contravention of the terms 
agreed upon expressly disregards Mr. Rose's r ight and necessity to contract 
for needed terms in his employment relations. Such u t te r disregard of 
Mr. Rose's r ights contravenes and violates the policy demonstrated by the 
Utah legislature concerning protection for employees' r ight to contract. 
Consequently, Allied must be held liable for violation of this important societal 
goal and public policy. 
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ARGUMENT 
V 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MR. ROSE WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER AGAINST ALLIED ON THE BASIS OF 
ALLIEDTS VIOLATION OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND 
FAIR DEALING. 
As discussed in Argument IV, Point 3, the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is implied by law in every contract. This covenant is not merely 
applicable in the doctrine of wrongful discharge. It is applicable to every 
relationship based upon a contract, including employment contracts . For the 
reasons discussed in Argument IV, Point 3, Allied is liable for violation of 
this covenant and Mr. Rose is entitled to recover against Allied therefor. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court granted summary judgment to Allied. This judgment, 
however, clearly disregards the authority and facts supporting recovery for 
Mr. Rose. To support a summary judgment, Allied must prove that Mr. Rose 
could not produce evidence during a trial that would support a verdict in his 
favor. Allied has not satisfied this burden of proof. 
Presently applicable Utah law requires that Mr. Rose's employment 
contract was not terminable at will. Mr. Rose had an enforceable employment 
contract with Allied, duration of which could not be terminated during and on 
the basis of school. Under the general rule that employment contracts are 
terminable at will, there are several exceptions. The present case falls into 
the exceptions regarding an express or implied contrary agreement, 
independent consideration and estoppel. 
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Fur ther , Mr. Rose is entitled to recover under the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel, 
In addition, courts have recently combined the exceptions to the at-will 
doctrine with several other causes of action and attempted to clarify them 
under one new cause of action, wrongful discharge. Under the theory of 
wrongful discharge, Mr. Rose is entitled to recover on the basis of express 
or implied contract, the violation of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing and the violation of public policy. 
Finally, Mr. Rose is entitled to recover against Allied, in an independent 
cause of action, for the violation of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, that is implied by law in every contract. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Rose respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
summary judgment granted to Allied and grant summary judgment in his favor 
as a matter of law, or that failing, remand to the lower court for further 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this o73> day of November, 1983. 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the £ o day of November, 1983, I 
served the foregoing Brief of Appellant upon David A. Anderson, 
attorney for respondent, by depositing two copies thereof in the United 
States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
David A. Anderson, Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street 
P .O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
I am the manager at Allied Development Corp. 
Since August 1981, Willard Rose has been 
employed by our company and has fulfilled the 
following with an acceptable level of 
competancy. 
1• Managing the Sales Floor of the Clothing 
and Shoe Departments with a combined annual 
income over One Million Dollars• 
2. Supervise Ih employees in the process 
on running above departments. 
3. Seeing that merchandise is displayed and 
ready for items that on the ads for 
current week. 
h. Distribute footwear to all 3 stores. 
5. Handle all return merchandise to vendors. 
Comments: 
Richard Cowley^'Mgf' 
Date: 9/7/x 7 f 
Allied Development Corp., 
6419 S. State Street, 
Murray, Utah, 8^107 
(801 ) 262-6Vn 
Murray S to re 
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ESTMINSTER flWlFfl—i 1 8 4 0 S o u t h 1 3 0 0 East 
DLLEGE j • • • j Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
Telephone (801) 484-7651 
T A B L I S H E D 1 8 7 5 
April 8, 1983 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
This is to verify Fall 1982 Tuition charges to WILLARD ROSE, a current 
student at Westminster College. Willard was charged $1645.00 which 
was paid in full by different forms of financial aid. 
[l^ar&Lfa 
Nancy Ricks 
Westminster College 
Accounts Receivable 
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IfoWl frUHikt tf&lt WUHHf t&t iKtCUMUH&d* TOt&t 
December 22, 1982 
Mr. Will Rose 
52 South 350 East 
North Salt Lake, Utah 8505^ 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
This letter is a reference for Mr. Will Rose. He was em-
ployed by Allied Development Co. as a manager of the Shoe 
Department for over one year. In addition to Manager of 
this department, he managed and supervised the personell. 
His attitude and performance in this position was commendable.1 
We would recommend him for any position of this nature. 
Jets-el 
Manager 
JDW/cb 
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• I 
TERMINAL OUT OF BumtDS 
< x Thuft j f money or goods 
2 . Plujiriti riy' wl t i1, i iv«.' .',i ;(1|.I. I ^ H . 
J> Uriii-.r t-f„nii  Inf luence of dni^u or alcohol 
I4. Kallure to report to work second t i a a 
5« Wi l l fu l .d isrespect ""•] uaij.^ciUMjl', 
6 T""i 11,1 i,k v i o l a t i o n 
7» Willful d e s t r u c t i o n of merchandise or pi 1»; «i 1-
n La "to t>*n nLnutO1* 0?" <;i"" H >,' I I , M J w.mi 
mat ,1 ii,v ir ijfjuwn^ on aalua f loor or Warefcouae ur ya rd 
11' 11" 1 1 111 ± unau t bo r l M d d i s c 0 un t s 
Mi Taking no nay under fnt.ji 1, ,1 - JI unmoa, 
m 
• m 
OPERATIONAL OUT OF BOUNDS 
1
 Smock*1, '/wHt", finii aim ihj ' i ' L i^s 6 , P - J I L L I ^ t o answer phones 
;' 1 Ud a t LI U d u S , 1 \ 1} ,( 1; ^ .
 (K, (fljr ,„ , 
3» Fa i lu re , to acknowledge customer "' .wruxxii^ on s a l e s f loor 
Li Eicaofltve t>eninti 11 1 hub 1 , , 1 1 3 
5 'n iL'ltill^lng wlUi frluncki while working 
*• Fa i lu re to keep brtiiik room el.u«ju 
, . Attending MIM.* i.ujliung neioLi,;^-
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